I feel privileged to have these players. We’ve asked them to work hard and I’d like to congratulate everyone who’s worked towards this. We played much better than in Rome [in 2009] – at the end of that final I said we’d played a good game, but when I looked at it again I wasn’t that impressed. That served its purpose because we played much better today and created more chances than two years ago.
The way we won is what I’m most proud of – this is how I want to play football.
-Josep Guardiola, May 28 2011
Rome is already in the past. But it’s hard not to think of that match right now. Two European Championships in three years. But that makes three in five years so it’s only natural for Paris 2006 to come to life again and start beating in the same chamber of the heart that’s racing so fast in chests of cules around the world after witnessing the joy of London 2011.
The Dream Team – is even further away. But there’s Guardiola yelling out instructions pointing furiously to where his players should be positioned while they are up 3-1 in the Champions League final with only a minute or so to play (it’s just one minute Pep!). There he is worried, gesticulating – thinking – to the very end of the competition just as he did when he was on the pitch as a player for those legendary Dream Team sides. And afterwards during the press conference when he’s being asked leading question about whether this Barça is greater than that Dream Team – there’s Pep reminding us of how Cruyff’s squad were the template – how without them and what they did there is no Barça 2010/11. There he is, the man who is tasked with carrying that oldest of burdens – keeping the flame – reminding us of how wondrous, how unlikely this beautiful FC Barcelona project has been for over one hundred years and how we should never take the joy it provides as a gift for granted.
The Opening: United Come Out Brightly
The match opened very similarly to how the last Champions League final between these two clubs did. United played very brightly and had the better of play to start. This was not unexpected, however. This Barça teams greatest weakness all season has been their depth. And for the second half of the season the team looked exhausted and in turn vulnerable. Sealing the Liga title early was critical because it allowed Guardiola to provide full rest to his side for two weeks. United sealed their league early as well – but given that they were the deeper squad and Ferguson had rotated players more during the season the added rest was much more important for Barça.
However, given Barça’s intricate one touch system and the amount of minutes the players are used to getting, the risk of that rest was that the team may not be fully up to match speed and would suffer from some rust that would require time to shake off.
United played very well to open -they pressed high and circulated the ball very rapidly. At the same time Barça were off form and did in fact look somewhat rusty. What marked the slow opening for Barça was uncharacteristically heavy touch and poorly weighted balls on passes. Messi miscontrolled a few balls. Pedro and Alves both lost possession cheaply on several occasions. Even Xavi and Iniesta were searching to establish their own rhythm in the game.
United did well to press their advantage in those early minutes. Their focus became very clear. They immediately played long balls to their right flank in order to isolate Valencia and test Abidal. They expanded that approach by doing the same with direct balls to Hernandez.
Given these dynamics it became imperative for the club to play solidly at the back, especially until the possession game became composed again. Much had been made before the game about he importance of the first goal – especially after that first goal had turned it for Barça in Rome in 2009. It was imperative that composure and solidity were maintained until an attacking rhythm could be created.
And it’s in these moments that Victor Valdes demonstrates again and again his brilliance and his value. Because in the opening minutes United brought significant pressure to bear high up the pitch. They forced mistakes and played with sharp movement. In turn Barça didn’t look composed defensively. The game had an unsettled character at the back. Seven and a half minutes in, van der Sar played a long ball from his own box for the United front line to run into space for in an attempt to get behind the high Barcelona back line through direct play. And it nearly worked.
Alves and Abidal were high up the pitch. Pique was to the left of center and marking Hernandez. Mascherano was positioned poorly and got turned the wrong way on the long ball from van der Sar. Rooney gained a step on him and then accelerated away from the off balance Barça CB. van der Sar’s distribution was on line and Rooney was clear through in space waiting to control the ball.
For a keeper this is a play where a mistake cannot be made. Stay back and cut down the angle or come out hoping you can beat the striker to the ball? And once again Valdez made the right decision and had the tremendous athleticism needed to get off his line and just beat Rooney to the ball. Barça were fortunate that the ball took a high bounce and Rooney had to wait for it a split second. But Valdes made a tremendous play hurling through the air, knowing that Rooney was barreling down right into him, and punched the ball away just before Rooney could get a touch on it.
Two minutes later Busquets made an off line pass to Messi in the center circle. Messi controls those kinds of substandard passes all of the time. But during these opening minutes his touch let him down and Carrick recovered the ball and played it to Giggs. Giggs took one touch to settle and evade Busquets press and then played a perfectly weighted long pass on the ground.
The pass split the entire center of the Barça formation, past the two center backs, and into space for Hernandez to run onto. Pique arrived on the ball first. But in trying to out run the much faster United striker, Pique mishit the ball back towards Valdes who himself was coming off his line at a sprint to intercept the ball. Rather than tap the ball back to Valdes, Pique wound up hitting the ball very hard. And by that time Valdes was already out of the box and only a few meters separated the Barça players. Based on pure quickness and reflexes Valdes was somehow able to get a foot on the mishit back ball averting an almost certain own goal. Few other keepers in the world would have had the foot skills and quickness to prevent that near disaster. Danger averted. Barely.
And then with ten unsettled, precarious minutes over – just as in Rome 2009 – the game changed. This time it wasn’t a goal out of the blue that did it. It was a more substantive change. Barça started developing that rhythm with the ball that defines who they are, that marks their identity. They started dictating tempo. Started caring for the ball as if were precious. That is – they became Barcelona again.
And with that – the match was functionally over. Outside of a brief break in concentration that led to the United goal, Barcelona utterly dominated throughout. They played football at a level few sides have every been able to play, never mind against a world class team like United in a Champions League final being played in England.
Think about the weight and pressure on the opposition facing Barça. The blaugrana are rusty and off form. And all you have is ten minutes to try to win the entire match. And once that opportunity passes you will never be able to dictate the terms of the engagement again. Ten minutes is all you have. And for the next eighty all you can do is react as Barcelona dictates the match by executing it’s template.
Barcelona Dictates Play: Tactical Analysis
As outlined in the tactical preview Alex Ferguson faced a significant dilemma headed into this match. United started their season playing two different tactical systems: a 4-4-2 wtih Berbatov as a target man up top and a 4-2-3-1 in competitions where they would need an extra midfielder to better control possession. Ultimately, Ferguson merged advantages from both system forming a dynamic 4-4-1-1 with Rooney playing behind the pacey Javier Hernandez.
The key to this formation was Rooney’s work rate and positional intelligence, qualities which allowed him to function as a false 9 from the second striker position. By doing so Rooney allowed United to have both a two man strike force up top, but to also diminish the impact of United only playing two midfielders. By dropping deep Rooney could prevent United from losing midfield due to a 2 vs. 3 numerical disadvantage.
It was under this system that United played their best football the entire season. It was this system which had won them the EPL, with a dominant performance against Chelsea late in the season and had then seen them through to the Champions League final.
While the dynamic 4-4-1-1 worked wonderfully for United it was an open question of whether the system could work against a team that circulated the ball and retained possession as well as Barça. Two major problems arise. First, the 4-4-1-1 asks Rooney to almost play two positions at once. If Rooney couldn’t fall back fast enough to midfield Untied would be overwhelmed 3 vs. 2 by Barça. This advantage would only be amplified when Messi dropped to midfield as a false 9. Second, the 4-4-1-1 formation does not have a true holding player positioned between the lines. And this space is one that Barcelona is particularly adept at exploiting.
Ultimately, Ferguson elected to play the formation that brought his team to it’s strongest level of play this season: the 4-4-1-1. United had dismantled sides playing 3 man midfields for much of the entire season and it was that 4-4-1-1 formation that had carried United through to the finals in the first place.
However, Ferguson did not simply ignore the vulnerabilities of his system. He attempted to augment his base system tactically to counter Barça’s strengths. This is a point that has not been focused on enough since the end of the match. Ferguson implemented several interesting tactical maneuvers to try to make up for the two major problems United were facing tactically – potential numerical disadvantage in midfield and space between the lines. The key players in these changes were Ji-Sung Park, Antonio Valencia and Patrice Evra.
Headed into the match it was widely believed that Ferguson would use Park in his accustomed role – as a defensive left winger to track Dani Alves’ surges forward. Ferguson significantly altered Park’s role in this match. Park was stationed on the left wing but from that position he was constantly pinching in towards midfield to provide support in the center. One of Park’s roles was to mark Messi when possible if the Barça false 9 dropped to midfield in the center-right region.
Ferguson also had Valencia play by pinching in to the middle as well though not to the degree that Park was.
In essence, Ferguson was hoping that Park’s tremendous work rate and stamina would allow him to almost play two positions at once – one as a right winger to slow Alves and one as an auxiliary midfielder to support Carrick and Giggs.
Ferguson also expanded the role of Patrice Evra as well. Evra was charged with not only playing LB, but also tracking runs into the space between the lines. From that left back position he was responsible in part to track Messi when he dropped between the lines to the center-right part of the pitch. Fabio would act similarly at RB but not to the degree that Evra did. Again, this was likely due to the fact that Messi operates largely in the center right position. Like Park, Ferguson was asking Evra to almost play two positions at once to make up for the tactical weaknesses of the 4-4-1-1. Evra was not only to play LB but also almost as a holding midfielder at times.
And these two tactical changes built on top of what Ferguson was asking Rooney to do as a false 9 where he was also being asked to almost play two different positions at once as well- striker and attacking midfielder.
So in essence, to address Barcelona’s tactical strengths from a 4-4-1-1, Ferguson was asking three players on his squad to play in two different positions each through their work rate, stamina and athleticism. As long as United could maintain a very high work rate this strategy could hold. This is partly why United were so strong in the first ten minutes. Park in particular covered enormous space when United opened strongly.
However, once Barcelona found their rhythm and began circulating the ball with crisp off the ball movement, Ferguson’s tactical adaptations were overwhelmed. Rooney, Park and Evra could try to cover enormous amounts of space defensively – but Barça just moved the ball too fast for them to sustain this approach. And in addition, once United tired even slightly, Barça forced the approach to collapse through their use of the ball. Ferguson partially acknowledged this problem in the second half when he permanently shifted Park to the middle and Giggs to the right wing. But by then it was too late. The dynamics of the match had been set.
Perhaps the most surprising tactical development in this game was what Barça did not do. Given that Park was constantly pinching to the middle Dani Alves was functionally unmarked for much of the first half. Rarely has Alves every been left alone like that and on very few games has he had that much space to run into since coming to Barça. It was initially very surprising that Barça did not circulate the ball and run the attack through Alves on that flank. In the second half, it was very clear that Giggs could not track Alves’ runs. Barça played the ball out to Alves on a few occasions and he generated several very dangerous chances. But on the whole, even in the second half with an older Giggs on him, Alves wasn’t utilized as a weapon to the degree that he could have been. This may have been a sub-optimal tactical approach on Barça’s part.
However, it’s likely there was another reason why the attack wasn’t directed through Alves on the right – Barça were so overwhelming in the center of the pitch that an outlet on the flanks wasn’t needed. The attack could be directed through the middle because opportunities were being generated over and over in that region of the pitch.
The Busquets-Xavi Axis: The Use of the Ball to Control Space
Few players in the history of football have had the influence on game play that Xavi has had. Simply by the sheer number of touches he has on the ball and number of passes he executes he is the player who so often dictates play and defines the rhythm of the match. Over the past several years it has been Xavi’s responsibility to take the burden of play off of his midfield partners. Xavi is required to function in a way which allows Iniesta the freedom he needs to express himself in an advance attacking role. At the same time Xavi has been required to support the Barça holding player by dropping deep to relieve pressure and to build play from deep when needed.
Few players in the history of football have had the influence on game play that Xavi has had. Simply by the sheer number of touches he has on the ball and number of passes he executes he is the player who so often dictates play and defines the rhythm of the match. Over the past several years it has been Xavi’s responsibility to take the burden of play off of his midfield partners. Xavi is required to function in a way which allows Iniesta the freedom he needs to express himself in an advance attacking role. At the same time Xavi has been required to support the Barça holding player by dropping deep to relieve pressure and to build play from deep when needed.
In many ways, this Champions League final was a seminal match for Barça from a tactical standpoint. It was a match that may signal a significant alteration in the way the opposition tries to defend and the way that Barcelona structures it’s attack. What was remarkable to watch in this match was the manner in which Sergio Busquets provided the foundation which enabled Xavi to play his game to the fullest. Rather than Xavi forming the platform for the other midfielders it was Busquets who formed that base. In turn this allowed Xavi to utterly dominate the match.
Xavi Hernandez is arguably the greatest player of his generation. And in this Champions League final we had the privilege of watching one his finest performances. For me he was clearly the man of the match.
But as with so many things in Barça, that individual brilliance was built on the context of the surrounding system. And in this match it was Busquets – more than even Iniesta – who allowed Xavi to play to his utter best.
This is not to say that Busquets has not made an outstanding partner for Xavi in the past. What I mean by this is the following: in yesterday’s match United took defensive resources and concentrated them on stopping Busquets. Usually teams will first and foremost devote all resources possible to stopping Xavi. In turn they leave Busquets as the player in midfield with the most time and space on the ball. A concrete example of this was the Champions League semi-finals against Real Madrid. In that match, Xavi completed 80 passes. Busquets completed 129. Madrid overplayed the advanced midfield position and challenged Busquets to control that match. They devoted intense defensive resources to stopping Xavi and chose to allow Busquets to have more time on the ball.
In the Champions League finals, Ferguson decided that he could not simply allow Busquets time and space on the ball. He would have to mark him and mark him strongly. Wayne Rooney focused on stopping Busquets for almost the entire match. Rooney was United’s best defender in the middle of the pitch – and he was playing Busquets. This also came at a real cost – because Rooney was defending Barça’s defensive midfielder, it was relatively easy for Busquets to snuff out counter attacks during fast transitions – Rooney was already close to him.
And even when Xavi took control of the game United still continued to allocate a defender to stop Busquets. This was partly because in his false 9 role Rooney could most readily track the Barça holding player. That said, overall, Busquets ability on the ball to dictate tempo from the back was considered such a threat that United maintained focus on him throughout. A major tactical dynamic in the finals was the fact that United felt compelled to defend Busquets, even if it meant ceding freedom to Xavi. This almost never happens. Few times has there been matches where the opposition felt so strongly about Busquets that they were willing to assume risk with Xavi so that both central midfielders could be defended.
With this freedom behind him, Xavi was able to not only control possession but to push forward to advance positions on the pitch to force the attack. Interestingly, Xavi almost played in as an advanced a position as Iniesta did in this match.
A Refreshed Squad
Watching this match it became very quickly apparent how fatigued the squad has been over the second half of the season. The two weeks off did wonders for their freshness. We were all wondering what was going on with David Villa these past many games. From how he played tonight it is clear that fatigue was a major part of his struggles. With two weeks off he returned to the pitch and played a dominant game along with the rest of his teammates. Straight away you could see that Barça were fresh and back to playing crisp football. In this sense, the most important thing Barça did to win the Champions League was to win La Liga outright early.
The Pep Guardiola Difference
There’s so much to say. And to truly do justice to the accomplishments of this man would require more space than a match review allows. But with this victory Pep can now take a place besides greats like Michels, Sachhi, Chapman and Herrera as a manger who has not only won trophies but changed the way the game is conceptualized and played at the strategic and tactical levels. He now establishes himself as the reference against which other managers of this generation will be measured. His accomplishments as a player and manager are enormous.
There’s so much to say. And to truly do justice to the accomplishments of this man would require more space than a match review allows. But with this victory Pep can now take a place besides greats like Michels, Sachhi, Chapman and Herrera as a manger who has not only won trophies but changed the way the game is conceptualized and played at the strategic and tactical levels. He now establishes himself as the reference against which other managers of this generation will be measured. His accomplishments as a player and manager are enormous.
Conclusion
There has long been a belief in football that there is something that cannot be trusted about playing the game beautifully. That inevitably one must make trade offs between the romanticism of style and the pragmatism of trophies. And if a team plays with intense focus on style then disappointment will invariably follow. The Netherlands 1974. Brazil 1982. This belief has only heightened in the modern game due to the rapid development of athleticism and physicality across the pitch.
There has long been a belief in football that there is something that cannot be trusted about playing the game beautifully. That inevitably one must make trade offs between the romanticism of style and the pragmatism of trophies. And if a team plays with intense focus on style then disappointment will invariably follow. The Netherlands 1974. Brazil 1982. This belief has only heightened in the modern game due to the rapid development of athleticism and physicality across the pitch.
This Barcelona team has demonstrated that none of this has to be true.
Guardiola’s Barcelona found football in a certain shape and together they said this was not the only possible world. And that kind of longing is what makes history new all over again.
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